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Preface
Heritage renaissance
Kristof Van Assche
Heritage and identity are old concepts that are continuously revised, both 
academically and in social practice.
The scientific and policy discourses on what heritage is and should be have 
multiplied over the last decades. These heritage discourses, rooted in the 
18th century dialectics between romanticism and enlightenment, were 
revived and intensified by the growth of the tourist industry, and thus 
linked to processes of commodification, but simultaneously associated 
with the enlargement and deepening of the European Union. Meanwhile, 
political discourse on identity intensified after the influx of immigrants in 
the latter 20th century, and the same process of Europeanization. One can 
argue that European identity discourse, as in the conscious reflection on 
scales of identity, is a product of the Renaissance, when various forms of 
reflection emerged, later re- labeled as ‘science’, and when Europe’s map 
was a chequerboard of political entities that was in constant motion.
Renaissance Europe saw the emergence of nation- states, and a concurrent 
stream of state- sponsored reflection on national identity. Macchiavelli, 
writing about Florence in a time of perceived decay, returns to the issue 
of identity over and over again, under different names, but usually linked 
to the question of state survival. Cities and larger states need an identity, 
he argues, but certain identities are bound to generate more strategic and 
adaptive possibilities than others in a given time and place. And identities 
need to be plural. Cities have a ‘character’, just as people, but they also harbor 
families, factions, personalities, corrupting rich people, and they experience 
fashions, ups and downs. Unity and plurality recur at various points in his 
analyses of political success, and are thus at the heart of early European 
reflection on community. Conflicts and differences are needed, and ought to 
become visible, in order to harness the best resources in the state to adjust 
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to ever changing circumstances. But difference can also undermine, if the 
institutions are destabilized rather than transformed through it.
Renaissance Europe was also a place of re- discovery of the past, of the 
Roman and Greek past. Early tourism was already heritage tourism, since 
much was focused on visiting ruins and early digs. But the Romans of the 
Renaissance are not the Romans of the EU or the Romans of current heritage 
tourism (let alone the people living in 21st century Rome) The Romans of 
16th century humanism were awe- inspiring, father- figures that were alien 
and distant still. Christian sensibilities and lingering loyalties to often petty 
worldly regimes interfered with a deep admiration for a civilization deemed 
far superior. Thus an intensity and ambiguity perfused the experience of 
heritage that could be highly unsettling. The Romans made people question 
everything and everyone, including themselves.
If Europe is really working on its Renaissance, with the Roman empire as 
a silent point of reference, and if the revivals of both heritage and identity 
discourse are part of this new Renaissance, then both the Roman empire and 
its reinterpretation and experience during the first Renaissance can teach us 
a few things.
As the authors in this fascinating volume point out, both heritage and 
identity discourse can be instrumentalized, by proponents and opponents 
of European integration, as they can be commodified, in branding efforts 
with various implementations. Just as in Macchiavelli’s Europe, political and 
economic alliances shift, people get tired of things, are anxious, and in a 
tumultuous present they tend either to cling furiously to old (reinvented) 
identities or to redefine themselves on a regular basis. The past, and thus 
heritage, plays different roles at different times in these processes. In 
Renaissance culture, the Romans inspired a unity of thought we now label 
‘Renaissance’ but in the politics and identity politics of the day, the effects 
were much more intricately patterned.French law became modeled on 
Roman law, and a Roman- inspired legal profession and administrative ethics 
arose that gradually permeated French society, but Spain and Italy itself 
proved quite different.
Roman politics was dominated by a Papacy that also claimed authority based 
on the past, but the glories of antiquity had a very different character for 
the Papal states. The Romans killed Christ, their teachings are heretic or 
irrelevant, their unity and plurality often not compatible with the notion of a 
Cultural heritage and identity politics 9 
Preface: Heritage renaissance
Christian state. Their vision of the time of Jesus did not inspire political and 
cultural change, but served as an anchor for present views.
From different theoretical perspectives, and in very different case studies, 
the authors in this volume all assert the importance of the linkages between 
heritage, identity and political transformation. With great acuity, they 
distinguish between the roles of heritage and identity discourse in everyday 
life, in politics, the legal system, and in science. Scientific reflection, such 
as this volume, can only contribute to public debateif it confronts the actors 
with this fluidity and complexity of identity construction and the uses of 
heritage. Whatever scientists say can and will be used against them, will be 
turned upside down and twisted and bent often times, in political, cultural 
and legal games, but that does not devalue this line of work at all. Scientific 
observations will be turned into ammunition, but that is no reason to stop 
observing. As long as people are confronted with the variety of identity 
constructions over time and place, political and cultural conversations have 
access to this diversity, thereby diminishing the chance of hardening of 
distinctions and simplification of reasoning.
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Chapter  1. 
Ibn Battuta: about the Islamic and Arabic 
foundation and contribution to present-
day modern science
Sjoerd During
One might wonder, why is the name of a medieval Moroccan scientist, 
Ibn Battuta, the title of a scientific conference on identity and identity 
politics held in a Western European scientific institute? In this article I’ll 
briefly explain the importance of Islamic sciences from the medieval period 
for today’s modern western sciences. This will help us to understand Ibn 
Battuta in its context of medieval Islamic sciences.
The medieval era is often described as the dark ages, because of widespread 
poverty, diseases and most of all, because of a lack of development. The 
title dark ages might fit for most parts of Europe, but in contradiction the 
south and east of Europe knew a blooming civilization rapidly expanding 
and developing. The Islamic civilization, driven by the message of the new 
prophet Muhammad, quickly expanded to all corners of the by then known 
world. This expanding empire connected most parts of the world, resulting 
in a tremendous flow of migration, trade and development.
With the rise of the new Islamic empire other empires found their demise. 
Empires like the Byzantine and Persian left behind a great deal of knowledge 
gathered over centuries. There was a great demand for this knowledge by the 
Arab rulers because these traders had little experience in ruling the world. 
The great need for practical knowledge in booming cities like Baghdad 
and Damascus led to a quest of gathering, translating and developing the 
knowledge of the pre-Islamic world. A splendid example of this quest is 
‘Bayt al-Hikmah’ the house of knowledge in Baghdad. Founded in the 9th 
century by the Khalif, the Islamic leader, it’s object was to gather the world’s 
best scholars and gather and develop as much knowledge as possible. Many 
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influential scholars studied in this house of wisdom, like al-Khawarizmi who 
is still famous for his book al-Jabr from which the notion algebra stems.
Another important center for learning was Islamic Iberia, al-Andalus. 
Al-Andalus is often remembered for its coexistence between the three 
major religions. Muslims, Christians and Jews lived and worked side by side 
resulting in a great deal of inventions often forgotten by many of today’s 
scholars. In al-Andalus operated the first surgeons and for the first time 
astronomers rejected the geocentric Ptolemaic model of the universe and 
discovered the earth’s orbit. These discoveries enabled Columbus to sail 
towards the new world.
After the fall of al-Andalus the Iberian Peninsula returned into Christian 
hands. Soon the new kings would end the co-operation of the major religions 
and ban both Jews and Muslims. Their scientific heritage on the other hand 
was welcome to stay and a new translation and development wave started. 
This time scientific works in Arabic were translated into Latin, forming 
the basis of modern western sciences. Similar events took place in Italy 
where Arabic work would be translated. The institutions of this translation 
movement would form the basis of Europe’s first universities.
The French psychologist and sociologist Gustave Le Bon (1841-1931) said: 
‘The from Arabic translated documents, especially the scientific books, 
remained the sole source of gaining knowledge in the European universities 
during five or six centuries. And we can say that the Arabian influence in 
some disciplines, like medicine, remains until today. The works of Ibn Sina 
were still being taught in Montpelier in the last century.’
The Islamic religion has had great importance in and for this great quest for 
knowledge gathering and development.
The first word of the holy Quran revelated to the Prophet was the word 
‘Read’ (96:1), Islamic scholars therefore often name the Islamic civilization 
the civilization of ‘Read’. There are many locations in the Quran and in the 
sayings of the Prophet which encourage its followers to study and obtain 
knowledge. ‘Say (O Muhammad): are those who know equal with those 
who know not? But only men of understanding will pay heed.’ (39:9). It was 
because of this encouraging that immediately after the passing away of the 
Prophet a new scientific tradition emerged wherein scholars would abandon 
worldly pleasures and often travel great distances in able to study the Islamic 
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religion. It is said that the Famous gatherer of sayings of the Prophet, the 
Imam al-Bukhari had traveled the distance of a month on his camel to reach 
a man who he believed to know a saying unknown to himself. When he 
finally arrived he saw this man luring his horse with an empty sack, from 
this deceive Imam al-Bukhari knew he couldn’t be trusted and immediately 
returned back home.
Knowledge and scholars have a greater position in Islam then leadership and 
leaders. It is therefore that great scholars in past times and even in today’s 
time are welcomed with more respect and crowd than modern superstars 
or famous football players. Imam al-Jawzi (who died in 1201) wrote in his 
book ‘Sayd al-Khatir’ that sometimes his classes would be visited by no more 
than one hundred thousand students. It is also said that the famous Khalif 
Haron Rashid (766-809) once made pilgrimage and in the holy city of medina 
crowds would ignore him and storm to the great Islamic scholar Imam Malik 
(711-795).
These are just a few examples which show us how the first generations of 
Muslims valued knowledge and its people. It is their tradition which laid 
the basis for the great medieval scientific quest of the House of Wisdom in 
Baghdad and the later Andalusian quest in cities as Cordoba, Seville and 
Granada.
Where in this often forgotten part of history fits the man of our title, Ibn 
Battuta? Ibn Battuta was one of the medieval Muslim scholars, famous for his 
many travels around the world en the stories he left in his books. I’ll shortly 
introduce you to this scholar by briefly summarizing his life.
Ibn Battuta was as stated earlier a Moroccan scholar, specialized in Islamic 
law, born in the city of Tangier in the year 703 after hijra (1304 for the western 
calendar). At the age of twenty one he would decide to make a pilgrimage 
to the holy lands of haram, the land of Mecca and Medina. This pilgrimage 
would be the beginning of his many travels all across the Islamic empire 
which reached from Spain to China and Indonesia. He would travel to Egypt, 
Greater Syria, the Arabian Peninsula including Yemen, Persia, India, China, 
Indonesia, Russia and the heartlands of Africa. In these travels he would 
encounter many oddities and different cultures and cultural practices, of 
which he would keep note and later on write his famous books about.
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His travels and their stories is what Ibn Battuta is famous for. He has 
had influence in the disciplines of geography, history and also worthy of 
mentioning: anthropology, although this discipline didn’t officially exist. The 
books of ibn Battuta are still read today and overall found quite interesting, 
informative and also amusing. Maybe it’s flavor of amusement keeps him in 
remembrance, while other important scholars have been forgotten.
To wrap up: while Europe remained for ages in a status quo with poverty 
and underdevelopment, the Islamic civilization bloomed and created the 
basis for the later European scientific tradition to begin. Religion played an 
important role in this blooming Islamic civilization. It were the first Muslim 
scholars who created the norm and reference for later development. Ibn 
Battuta was one of them, and he lives on for ever, not only in conferences 
that carry his name With his legacy other histories emerge, other stories pop 
up new names are written. His books are on the www. READ and civilize.
Sources
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Chapter  2.
European heritage discourses, a matter of 
identity construction?
Roel During
2.1 Introduction
The words are familiar to us: Dutch cultural heritage, world heritage and 
European heritage. But what do they exactly mean? Some believe that 
European heritage is a specified category of world heritage, others consider 
it a special category of supra national heritage (Karnooh, 2001; Bugge, 2003). 
Can then a windmill be both Dutch and European heritage? Is a world 
heritage site within Europe automatically European heritage? Why do we 
have these blurring categories? These questions arise when considering 
the geographical and territorial conceptions of heritage and their cultural 
and political embeddings. These relations are rather complex, because 
some sites are meant to unify people in general (world heritage) and other 
categories are used to designate a nation, a community, an ethnic group or 
whatsoever (e.g. Dutch heritage). The latter category indicates differences 
or may even exaggerate oppositions when based on stereotyping. In this 
way it differs fundamentally from a category such as world heritage, 
representing universal values. World heritage is primarily meant to unite 
people by stashing peculiarities in the realm of history, worth to visit as a 
universal cosmopolitan tourist. Unification and separation are intertwined 
in signification processes produced in the realm of culture and politics. 
Cultural heritage as a special category of cultural values is produced by 
communities and reproduced in politics (Barnett, 2001; Lammy, 2006). 
In politics it is used to make the point of homogeneity and heterogeneity 
in different images of society (Amin, 2004). Some stress the complex 
nature of society and presuppose value pluralism as a fact of life (Berlin, 
2002; Ashworth, Graham et al., 2007). Others believe in certain universal 
values in society that serves as a basis for intercultural understanding and 
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stability (Raz, 2003; Leonardi, 2006).1 These contradicting views on value 
pluralism and value monism both are substantiated by referring to cultural 
heritage and stress its contribution to unification or its expression of cultural 
diversity. The opposition produces competing concepts of citizenship and 
identity, as citizenship focuses on value consensus which is again based on 
value monism, whereas the concept of identity lodges pluralist views on 
societal values (Graves-Brown et al., 1996; Tsaliki, 2007). Cultural heritage 
addresses issues of both pluralism and universalism and to understand these 
issues we need to explore the production of cultural heritage values and its 
relation to the politics of identity construction. It is this politics of identity 
construction that uses cultural heritage to mark differences or affiliations 
with other communities. ‘United in diversity’, Europe’s motto, has strong 
implications for the way politicians frame culture and its legacies we call 
cultural heritage.
Further exploration of the relations of identity politics and cultural 
heritage values will be done by describing the organisational settings of 
cultural heritage in Europe, followed by a concise overview of treaties and 
recommendations. This overview is needed to shed a light on a long lasting 
dispute in European heritage discourses that involves different views on the 
value of cultural heritage for the European society. For an extensive overview 
of cultural heritage policies and their ideological grounds, see During, 2010. 
Here we focus on identity as a leading concept to express this value. The 
idea of managing and creating identities is briefly discussed by means of 
different models, grounding different ideological and political viewpoints. 
These models are used to make the final point in this article: the limits of 
zero sum identity thinking and the consequences of acknowledging value 
pluralism and identity pluralism for cultural heritage.
2.2 European cultural heritage discourses
Hundreds of organisations are contributing to the European cultural heritage 
discourses and most of them are highly specialised or operating on a national 
scale.2 A simple overview of political and geographical overview is given 
1  Such as respecting the lives of other people, or the believe in the same god although in different 
religions. The idea of equality between people is based on value monism.
2  See the links on Europa Nostra: www.europanostra.org, such as for Industrial and Technical Heritage, 
Natural heritage, Village and Small Town heritage, European Maritime Heritage, Cultural Heritage without 
Borders.
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in Table 1. These organisations produce regulations, organise symposia and 
lobby for restoration funds.
The official Treaties that require ratification and signing of the countries 
constituting the EU are accompanied by a great number of Declarations and 
Recommendations. A brief selection of them is given in Table 2, indicating the 
formal and informal discourses, produced in the interaction of governments 
and NGO’s at national and international levels.
Treaties and declarations can be interpreted as forms of governance that try 
to establish consensus on good stewardship and good practices. This focus on 
consensus building is influenced by the dialectic relation of European ideology 
and national interests. There is a trend towards intangible cultural heritage 
categories, expressing concerns about safeguarding cultural diversity. It also 
shows a broadening of interests beyond the traditional fields of monuments 
and archaeology. This trend contradicts the ideologies of the Venice Charter 
and the Faro Convention. The Venice Charter expresses the view of the 
NGO’s that governments have the obligation to take care of cultural heritage 
for future generations3. They are held responsible for the cultural heritage of 
a political entity. In practice this Venice Charter can be seen as a framework 
3  http://www.icomos.org/venice_charter.html.
Table 1. Cultural heritage organisations on different political and geographical 
scales.
Governmental Non-governmental
World UNESCO ICOMOS
Europe Council of Europe: 
(CDPATEP)
(HEREIN)
Europa Nostra
Nation National Agencies for Cultural 
Heritage
National NGO’s, expressing the 
interests of monument owners, 
organisers of festivals, and lovers of 
old stuff
Region Regional NGO’s, often related to city 
and countryside promotion
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for a wider lobby for restoration in the past decennia. Recently the Faro 
Convention focuses on the value of cultural heritage for society and in doing 
this it discriminates between European intellectual heritage and European 
monumental heritage.4 This convention frames cultural heritage as the 
agreed set of social values, rooted in history, on how society should operate. It 
stresses the function of cultural heritage in its role as a collective memory of 
the people of Europe. The Faro Convention expresses the view of the Council 
of Europe. The dispute concentrates on the autonomy of the expert. The Faro 
Convention no longer sees the expert as the only person who should decide 
what is a monument and what isn’t. The Council of Europe strives for a open 
inclusive cultural heritage definition and approach.
A closer look on the Faro definition of cultural heritage may help to clarify 
the ideological fundaments of the dispute. Cultural heritage is defined 
as ‘a group of resources inherited from the past which people identify, 
independently of ownership, as a reflection of their constant evolving values, 
beliefs, knowledge and traditions’ (Council of Europe, 2005). This definition 
already relates heritage to identity as a preamble for its value for society. The 
definition of European Heritage is ‘all forms of cultural heritage in Europe 
4  http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/199.htm.
Table 2. Some treaties, declarations and recommendations produces in the 
European cultural heritage discourse (During 2010).
Treaties Declarations and recommendations
UNESCO World Heritage Convention 1972
COE: European Cultural Convention 1954
COE: Convention of Valetta, 1992
COE: Convention of Faro, 2005
COE: Landscape Convention 2005
ICOMOS Venice Charter, 1964
UNESCO Recommendation on the 
Safeguarding of Traditional Culture and 
Folklore 1989
UNESCO Declaration on the Responsibilities 
of the Present Generations towards 
Future Generations 1997
UNESCO Declaration on Cultural Diversity 
2001
UNESCO Convention on Safeguarding of 
the Intangible Cultural Heritage, 2003
EC: European Heritage Label, 2004
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which together constitute a shared source of remembrance, understanding, 
identity, cohesion and creativity’, and ‘the ideals, principles and values, 
derived from the experience gained through progress and past conflicts, 
which foster the development of a peaceful and stable society, founded on 
respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law’ (Council of Europe, 
2005). In this definition a gleam of universalism emerges as cultural heritage 
is supposed to reflect the shared values and norms of European society. It 
is supposed to be inherent in good European citizenship and contribute to 
cross cultural understanding and stability. Implicitly the definition refers to 
the economic law of unique selling points when framing cultural heritage 
as a resource for societal development. This again could be interpreted 
as a pluralist view on cultural heritage, because every region and city in 
Europe fosters its own identity construction. The Faro understanding of 
cultural heritage is based on a territorial concept of culture and identity. 
The implications of this territoriality are discussed below.
2.3  The problem of zero sum identity and its 
underlying assumptions
Regarding the fact that politicians normally have a territorial conception 
of culture and identity, we can understand why the relationship between 
regional, national and European identities is often framed as a set of 
Matrushka’s or as a layer cake (Figure 1). Ideas on specific identities that are 
the products of specific regional life conditions give rise to identity constructs 
in which the geographical peculiarities of region plays a significant role. This 
idea can be easily combined with notions of wider scale identities such as 
national and European in which citizenship with its shared norms and values 
nationregion Europe
Figure 1. The Matrushka identity model.
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are presupposed. The idea of a layer cake is widespread among European 
federalists (Risse, 2003) and the idea of a Matrushka is used by regional actors 
in European projects. Politicians believe that an increase in one identity 
layer necessarily causes a decrease of another layer. For example more 
European identity is supposed to cause a serious decline in national identity. 
This is called ‘zero sum’ identity thinking and it is supposed to be one of the 
major drawbacks of Europeanization (Risse, 2003). The Matrushka’s seem 
to fit, but do they fit in case of 27 countries and their numerous regions? 
The idea of a layer cake or of a Matrushka seems to be rather simple to 
account for a complex society like Europe (Ashworth et al., 2007). This can 
be explored by a further evaluation of the presupposed manageability of 
identity construction and their accountings for pluralism and universalism. 
This will be done by elaborating five distinct identity models.
These identity models are derived for the sake of this article from identity 
disputes and scientific research. They are designated with short names 
indicating their rationale.
The Cartesian Radar Plot Model (Figure 2) is based on an understanding 
of identity construction as a pure rational process that can be influenced by 
politicians and their branding activities (Hendriks, 2004). Political branding 
of course is inspired by commercial branding success stories. An nice 
example of this type of branding can be found in the Netherlands with the 
so called Green Heart of the Randstad, a planning concept created by policy 
experts who in vain expected it to be assimilated by its inhabitants during 
the past 50 years (Hidding, 1997). The model is indicated below.
The Contextual Identity Model (Figure 3) allows for social interaction as the 
primary process leading to a specific identity.
It is based on a Castells understanding of a network society. The model 
presupposes identities to develop interactively. One needs other peoples 
reactions and labels to develop one’s own identity. Chosen identities depend 
on the networks people participate in (Borgt et al., 1996). One can develop 
more than one identity. Clothing, haircut and other features (such as the 
white shoelaces) are supposed to play an important role. Identity creation 
is considered to be influenced by associations. This way of conceptualizing 
identity is widespread in marketing, trying to establish brands connected to 
positive associations. A strong example is the appeal to the American street 
culture by certain clothing brands.
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Figure 2. The Cartesian Radar Plot Identity Model.
Figure 3. The Contextual Identity Model.
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The Narrative Identity Model (Figure 4) considers identity construction as a 
flexible set of choices from an individual’s biography that can be adjusted to a 
specific situation or conversation. It is supposed to be highly individualistic, 
accounting for a combination of strategic considerations and emotional 
choices made in every selection. Some examples illustrate its relationship 
with collective memory, when communities define themselves a the result 
of a sequence of (mostly atrocious) precedents (Peckham, 2003). In Lithuania 
identities are characterized as injured identities by specialists, because of the 
negative narratives of communism (Cepaitiene, 2001). This model is used 
in psychology (Gardiner and Mayerfeld Bell, 1998; Shotter and Billig, 1998).
The Onion Model (Figure 5) presupposes identities to contain a very inflexible 
and ossified core around which more casual identities can be wrapped up. 
Persons have core values that cannot be changed (Hopkins and Blackwood, 
2011). So if you are born as a male person in Western Europe, much of your 
identity is already given and not subject to any change. It supposes identity 
processes to be a combination or interaction of cognitive and unconscious 
processes. Only the outer layers of the onion can be influenced to a certain 
extend. This model is used in anthropology.
In anthropological theory the ossified models of identity are related to an 
outdated essentialist understanding of culture (Grillo, 2003). This qualification 
Figure 4. The Narrative Identity Model.
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invoked new non-essentialist theories, based on processual theory in which 
identities are seen as constructed in a constant flux. The Onion Model takes 
an intermediate position because of its dynamic interaction between core 
and outer layers.
The Drifting Identity Model (Figure 6) draws on poststructuralist theory as 
it challenges the concept of identity as a stable ‘self’ with a single, discernible 
‘intent’ (Derrida, 1966). Instead identities are supposed to develop trough 
path dependency mechanisms, in which every previous change in identity 
invokes adjustment of identity to a new situation in a dualistic cognitive 
and unconscious process. It is based on a Foucauldian perspective on events 
in which nothing is taken for granted, but put in a historic perspective 
indicating its constitutive power relations. Identities in this perspective can 
only be understood as the sum of precedents in which a person or a group 
subjectifies itself by relating to agencies in their environment. The process 
as a whole is unmanageable and non-determinist for persons or groups 
themselves let alone for outsiders trying to steer identity construction in 
predefined directions.
These identity models can be used to compare different assumptions 
with respect to their vulnerability to branding and management and with 
respect to the production of cultural values in networks and communities. 
If one person can have different identities that relate to different social 
environments, he might have different or even contradicting values. If these 
Figure 5. The Onion Model of Identity.
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identities are considered as merely superficial, he can have fundamental 
or even unconscious emotional values that relate to the values he uses to 
make decisions. A concise overview of the relations between manageability, 
values and identity models is given in Table 3.
This comparison allows for a better understanding of identity claims on 
cultural heritage. Politicians tend to adhere to the manageable conceptions 
of identity, that relate to a single core image of society in which value 
consensus is deemed necessary to establish social cohesion (Parsons, 
1951; Friedman, 1992). The Cartesian Radar Plot aligns with a territorial 
conception of culture and reflects the dominant conception of identities 
in discussions on Europeanization. This conception allows for regional 
branding which is the aim of many programmes and projects in Europe of the 
Regions. In scientific research the concepts based on pluralism and internal 
ossification are prevailing, see (Friedman, 1992; Howard, 2000). Although 
these concepts seem to give a better account for the cultural diversity that 
is encountered in the field of heritage, they are neglected by politicians. 
This is why identity competition is based on value monism in a single core 
society. In this competition there is no basic distinction between values and 
norms. If one departs from value pluralism then one needs norms to deal 
with this diversity: values and norms are un-exchangeable. Democracy in 
the value monism discourse is at the same time an intellectual heritage, the 
Figure 6. The Drifting Identity Model.
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key citizenship value and the norm to make any decision. The single core 
image of society inherent in this disposition causes the zero sum identity 
thinking so embarrassing for those who believe in cultural diversity as the 
most important characteristic of Europe.
Table 3. Simple comparison of identity models with respect to their assumptions 
regarding value consensus, manageability and its relationship to cultural heritage.
Value monism Value pluralism
Manageable by politicians Cartesian radar plot, framing 
identity primarily as a 
rational process subdue to 
branding activities. Cultural 
heritage is used for branding 
the identity of a single core 
society.
Contextual model:
influencing the context 
invokes identity adaptation. 
Cultural heritage is used to 
mark differences between 
communities.
Not manageable, because 
considered highly inflexible 
and ossified in its core.
Onion model, mostly already 
defined by kinship. Cultural 
heritage is used to penetrate 
in the core and represents 
the value consensus 
inherent in good citizenship.
Not manageable, 
because considered 
primarily autonomous or 
undeterminable.
Narrative model: a set of 
individualized choices 
differently made in different 
situations, not free from 
emotions. Cultural heritage 
is used to produce and 
maintain the social memory 
and to clarify affiliations and 
uniqueness.
Drifting model: path 
dependency in choices 
invoked by environmental 
changes, seemingly 
haphazardly taken without 
internal coherence.
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2.4 Conclusions
There is disagreement on the relationship between cultural heritage and 
identity. For politicians this is a universalist one in which cultural heritage 
expresses their strive for social cohesion at EU, national or regional level. 
This striving leads to identity competition between these political levels. 
The very idea of European identity encompassing national identities and 
these again the regional ones seems attractive but fails to address the cultural 
pluralism that many see as characteristic for Europe.
Scientists advocate more pluralist and less manageable concepts of identity. 
These concepts seem better equipped for clarify pluralism in cultural 
heritage practices, but is abandoned by politicians. They are simply not 
appealing because of a lack of manageability and their inherent relationship 
with value pluralism in society. Value pluralism and cultural diversity are 
perceived as a potential danger for social cohesion.
The politics of identity construction uses cultural heritage to improve the 
social cohesion of their image of a society with a single core. Politicians of 
course position themselves in the middle of that core. Practice however shows 
that cultures can produce their identity rather independently from politics. 
These self made identities are highly positional and relational. A focus on 
achieving value consensus, embedded in an accepted form of European 
identity, is destined to fail because more complexity is needed in societal 
models, value pluralism and identity construction. The unmanageability 
and pluralist character of identity construction should be taken as a point 
of departure for European societal policies. Consequently, cultural heritage 
should be treated as expressions of cultural diversity, whereas citizenship 
should not be conceptualised on value consensus but on shared norms 
embedded in democracy.
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Chapter  3.
The market of collective identities and 
legacy work5
Itamar Even-Zohar
Identity policy, the deliberate inculcation of a cluster of elements as 
inherently representative of a group, has been an indispensable procedure 
in group management since time immemorial.6 Dominant forces have 
been using quite consistently this procedure to rule efficiently. When this 
policy is successful, optimally every single member of the group takes that 
cluster of elements as their personal property. The group would then reject, 
individually and collectively, attempts at eliminating elements from the 
cluster, whether initiated from within or from without. Being in possession 
of a collective identity has evidently been a primary condition not only for 
keeping a group together, but also for legitimizing its existence as a separate 
entity, which allows it privileges and distinction from other groups: ‘[…] the 
Egyptians might not eat bread with the Hebrews; for that is an abomination 
unto the Egyptians’ (Genesis 43: 32; KJV version).
An illustration for such a collective commitment was recently provided by 
the controversy over the crucifix in school classrooms in Italy. A lawsuit was 
brought to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg by an Italian 
citizen of Finnish origin and others7, who maintained that:
…the presence of crucifixes in State-school classrooms in Italy, […] [is] 
incompatible with the obligation on the State, in the exercise of the functions 
which it assumed in relation to education and to teaching, to respect the right 
of parents to ensure such education and teaching in accordance with their 
own religious and philosophical convictions. (Press Release by the Registrar 
of the Court, no. 234, 18/03/2011).
5  I am grateful to Rakefet Sela-Sheffy for her invaluable suggestions and comments.
6  For an extensive discussion of deliberate culture planning see Even-Zohar 2008.
7  Lautsi and Others v. Italy (application no. 30814/06).
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The court ruled against the plaintiffs, thus confirming that Christianity is an 
indispensable component of the European identity. Italy’s foreign minister, 
Franco Frattini, is quoted to have said: ‘Oggi ha vinto il sentimento popolare 
dell’Europa. Perchè la decisione interpreta soprattutto la voce dei cittadini 
in difesa dei propri valori e della propria identità’ (Corriere della Sera, 
18/03/2011).8 In the Vatican, reported El Pais, ‘el presidente del Pontificio 
Consejo para la Cultura del Vaticano, el cardenal Gianfranco Ravasi, […] ha 
recordado que “si Europa pierde la herencia cristiana” pierde también “su 
propio rostro”’ (Miguel Mora, El Pais, 18/03/2011).9 This crucifix controversy 
is probably only the tip of the iceberg in nowadays conflicts within the 
European Union countries over who owns the culture, namely who has 
got the right to tell whom what to do. Certainly, the reluctance to accept 
countries with predominantly non-Christian population has been a major 
cause for not accepting such a country as Turkey as a member.
Similarly, refusing secession for a group is also frequently based on the 
belief that the group seeking secession has no legitimate claim for a distinct 
identity. The slogan used by the Quebec separatists, ‘Nous sommes différents’, 
amply vociferated during the 1995 referendum campaign by Quebec’s 
Premier Jacques Parizeau, was rejected by the Anglophone members of the 
confederation. In a meeting held on October 9, 1991, Parizeau said:
Eux [the Anglophones] ont défini leur pays (sur la Charte canadienne des droits, 
laquelle est devenue […] le symbole de l’identité canadienne). Nous sommes 
en train d’en définir un autre. Cela ne nous rend pas moins démocrates pour 
autant. […]. Cela nous rend différents (Parizeau, 1997: 237-238)10.
‘Being different,’ that is having a different culture, and consequently 
a different identity, has thus been the major argument for justifying the 
separation of Quebec, or any other group for that matter in history, ancient 
or modern.
It is thus evident that the endeavors invested in the making, inculcation 
and declaration of a cluster of elements which constitute a group’s identity 
8  ‘Today has won the popular sentiment of Europe; because the decision interprets above all the voice 
of the citizens in defense of their proper values and their proper identity. ‘
9  ‘The president of the Pontifical Council for Culture in the Vatican, Cardinal Gianfranco Ravasi, […] has 
maintained that ‘if Europe loses the Christian heritage’ it’ll also lose “its proper face”.’
10  ‘They [the Anglophones] have defined their country (on the Canadian Charter of Rights [and 
Freedoms], which has become […] the symbol of Canadian identity). We are in the course of defining 
another one. This does not make us less democratic as such. […] This makes us different.’
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has always had a double function: to achieve group cohesion as well as 
distinction on the basis of recognized assets.
Achieving group cohesion, and the creation of a sense of belonging, may 
entail demands for group loyalty and sacrifices from the group members. 
Without such individual dispositions, there can be no group agreements 
that are a fundamental condition for maintaining life among human beings. 
While in many periods in human history, such socially cementing elements 
have been created and diffused ‘from below’ by individuals or small groups, 
other times this kind of work was initiated and maintained ‘from above’, 
namely by rulers and leaders of groups. Ruling bodies do not necessarily 
cater for the interests of the population ruled by them, which in extreme 
cases may simply lead to cultural and political revolutions (that is, a drastic 
deliberate change of repertoire).
Evidently, whether in ancient Egypt or in modern Great Britain, beyond 
a certain level of discrepancies between the repertoire promoted by the 
population and the one imposed by dominant forces, the latters’ tolerance 
can no longer be upheld. The ancient Egyptian state was engaged in a 
constant endeavor to harmonize the enormous variety of its population, as 
well as absorb the endless flux of migrants from all over the ancient world. 
In our own era, policies vary largely in different parts of the globe: some 
states, mostly totalitarian-ideological, would tolerate no such discrepancies, 
while other (Western democracies, for example) seem to allow certain 
latitude, even endorse ‘multiculturalism’. However, outbursts of discontent 
take place even within those more liberal states. Recently, on February 
2011, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, David Cameron, launched a fierce 
attack against what he considered to be an exaggerated tolerance towards 
what he believed to be unacceptable cultural repertoire. In his view, ‘State 
multiculturalism is a wrong-headed doctrine that has had disastrous results. 
It has fostered difference between communities, and it has stopped us from 
strengthening our collective identity. Indeed, it has deliberately weakened 
it’ (The Guardian, 6/2/2011).11
11  The Guardian’s editorial, however, strongly criticized Cameron: “David Cameron had an opportunity 
this weekend to say something interesting and relevant about a subject important to anyone who lives 
in Britain: how hyper-diverse societies can not only cohere, but thrive. He flunked it. What the prime 
minister offered instead was a mix of clichés, tired thinking and some downright offensive terminology 
(The Guardian, 7/2/2011).
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The function of collective identity as an asset, both endogenously and 
exogenously, makes it a symbolic capital that allows for the group’s status 
claims, namely justifying its existence as a separate entity (political or 
otherwise) and the exclusion of others. In his study ‘Icelandic nationality 
identity: from nationalism to tourism,’ Gísli Sigurðsson (Sigurðsson, 1996) 
shows how valorized goods (such as the old Icelandic manuscripts) are shown 
to official foreign visitors to reinforce Iceland’s cause. It is symptomatic that 
even though Iceland declared its independence in 1944, it was only in 1971, 
when the agreement with Denmark on the return of the manuscripts was 
signed, it was ‘the final confirmation that Iceland had gained its independence 
from Denmark’ (Sigurðsson, 1996: 60-61).
The valuation of identities is thus part of the everlasting intergroup 
competition over prestige and status, which in the final analysis means 
competition over access to resources. An intergroup stock-exchange of such 
assets has been determinative since antiquity in hierarchizing the various 
ethnic and political groups vis-à-vis each other, allowing some to have more 
say than others. To win the competition, ‘better elements’ always had to 
be shown as pertinent to the claimant group, and therefore the repertoires 
of elements quickly crystallized to encompass a variety of components: 
from impressive buildings, like pyramids, city gates, hanging gardens and 
temples, to claims about freedom, quality of life and wealth, more powerful 
gods, better justice, personal security, and any possessions or principles 
that happened to be highly valued at a time. This basic repertoire was 
providing powerful tools for groups to exercise identity formation. It has not 
changed much since ancient Egypt with its pyramids (or chariots, horses 
and ornaments) and its Ma’at (‘justice’) concept (Assmann, 1989),12 or 
since rulers of big and small states in the ancient Fertile Crescent boasted 
about the high quality of life for everyone within the territories they ruled 
(Green, 2003).13
12  I am grateful to Orly Goldwasser for her personal communication on Ma’at as a factor of culture 
planning.
13  Green summarizes the purpose of the boasting as follows: ‘[The boasted about] achievements cannot 
be divorced from the international competition for honor with friend and foe alike. Thus, they can 
be presented as the reversal of negative conditions--the destruction and desolation--created by the 
enemy. In this way, they are an extension of the king’s victories over his enemies and so provide further 
evidence of his superiority over them. Domestic achievements were also used to demonstrate the king’s 
superiority over other kings who were not regarded as enemies, e.g. fellow-vassals, and predecessors on 
the throne. They were also employed in a complex balance between the impulse to self-glorification and 
the recognition of the superiority of the king’s suzerain.’
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To enhance and facilitate the inculcation of identities, a variety of procedures 
has always been used, among which boasting about achievements in the 
form of rituals such as memorizing events and raising monuments have 
become to be the most popular.14 A collective memory indispensably had to 
become part of the repertoire shared by the relevant group. ‘Remember what 
Amalek did unto thee by the way, when ye were come forth out of Egypt’ 
(Deuteronomy 25: 17; KJV), or the Passover Text (Haggadah) instruction 
‘and ye shall tell it to your son’ (that is, the story of the exodus from Egypt) 
are two typical examples for memorizing rituals. No less symptomatic is the 
exhortation ‘raccontiamone la storia ai nostri figli e ai nostri nipoti;’15 in an 
article entitled ‘Ritroviamo l’orgoglio dell’Unità’ (‘let’s recover the pride of 
the Unity,’ Aldo Cazzulo, Corriere della Sera, 17/3/2011). These memories, 
stories told from one generation to the next, thus become common legacies, 
patrimony, an indispensable baggage to never be forgotten. Monuments, 
whether constructions or sites – stelae, sculptures, paintings, buildings, 
artifacts – work on the one hand to inscribe events and persons as part of 
the group’s identity, and to display the splendor of the group’s assets on 
the other. ‘Legacy work’ may thus refer to the two aspects of identity work, 
namely the creation of cohesion and the display of valuable goods.
Attempts at inculcating repertoires without some sort of persuasion hardly 
hold for more than a limited time, or do not hold at all. Violence, coercion, 
terror, and other non-peaceful methods of dictation cannot create the 
necessary consent among a group, and are therefore more costly to rulers, 
even if well-intended. In such cases as Peter the First’s, the Czar of Russia, 
or Muhammad Tughluq’s, the Sultan of Delhi, both aimed at reforming the 
repertoires of culture and the collective identity of their states. Tughluq has 
been far less successful than Peter the First, because he even failed to recruit 
the small group of adepts to support his reforms, as did Peter. Ibn Battuta 
has told the story of Tughluq’s abortive projects, which were intended as 
innovations on a grand scale. The reluctance of the people to accept his 
decisions has not made him understand what others along history seem 
to have known from the outset, namely that mere coercion does not pay. 
Typically for him (as for similar dictators), the opposition to his decisions 
was taken by him as just ‘une résistance ignorante et malveillante d’un 
peuple récalcitrant et mal disposé face à la justesse des actes d’un souverain 
éclairé. Cette vision des choses donne à ce dernier le droit d’imposer ses 
vues par la force et de punir les insoumis. Ainsi les plus grandes injustices 
14  For more about such procedures see During 2010.
15  ‘Let us tell the story [of the unification of Italy] to our children and grandchildren.’
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et les plus grandes cruautés se feront au nom de l’ordre, de la justice et des 
grands principes de gouvernement’ (Yerasimos, 1982)
There is a steady ebb and flow movement in respect to which aspect of 
the identity work, and the creation of legacies as part of it, dominates in 
different points of time. Roughly, it would seem justified to maintain that 
when a group is unstable, whether in a state of emergence or in crisis, 
identity work and the creation of legacies become major tools for securing 
its maintenance. In contrast, when a group has achieved a high level of 
cohesion, or when it is not threatened by adversaries, identity work may 
lose its intensity, and legacy work is mostly reduced to commodification of 
the objects and images (including stories and memories) that are part of the 
already recognized repertoire. It seems that at least in the cases of Greece 
and the Netherlands discussed by During (2010) this is actually the case. In 
contrast, in Lithuania ‘the underlying resistance of the inhabitants of Kaunas 
against the military history of the town’ (ibid.: 115) obliterated legacy plans 
devised by policymakers, and similarly in Crete, where ‘Cretan people didn’t 
like heritage, because it reminded them of periods in history in which they 
were not free’ (ibid.: 137).
Thus, in established countries of the European Union, those which no longer 
have to legitimize their existence or justify the value of their legacies, legacy 
work is already often detached from identity work, serving the purpose 
of reinforcing the value of the assets on display for sale. When there is an 
abundance of objects and images, the state institutions involved with the 
promotion of legacies often mostly only work to facilitate the physical 
access to such assets (like places and monuments, books and manuscripts) 
or duly promote them via publications, visiting deals, or the Internet 
(Sigurðsson, 1996). On the other hand, for areas little known or which need 
some economic injection, legacy objects and images may be dug from some 
imaginary or covert sources. In short, it would be justified to contend that 
heritage has become mostly a matter of competition about ‘who has got the 
better goods for sale,’ while for the majority of people in everyday life they 
carry very little meaning.
However, this is not an unchanging matter. As the unanticipated outburst of 
the British prime minister quoted above shows, what seems to be a stable 
situation may quickly change once people in the group sends a threat to 
their established identity. When this occurs, indifference makes room for 
heated engagement; identity clashes may splash seemingly out of the blue 
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over some forgotten, or until that moment unimportant objects, images, or 
memories stored in some obfuscated cache.
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Chapter  4.
Landscape’s silenced stories
Experiences of a foreign excursion as reflexivity practise for 
(students) education
Ralph Tangelder and Maaike Andela
4.1 Introduction
The importance of reflexivity in planning and design education (Schön, 
1987; Howe and Langdon, 2002; Sletto, 2010; Varnelis, 2007) is only recently 
introduced in the current curriculum of the Landscape Architecture and 
Spatial Planning educational programme of Wageningen University. Students 
might not be fully aware of the importance of reflection, especially because 
it has been seen as normal that different opinions about good education 
co-exist. Also for the profession, opinions between and within universities 
may radically differ. Several views on the roles of planners and landscape 
architects exist. ‘Opinions about what they do and what they are supposed 
to do differ.’ (Beunen et al., forthcoming, p. 5) These opinions are liable to 
changing ideas in time. Being aware of these changing ideas should encourage 
students in starting to be reflective. ‘A broadly conceived familiarity with 
politics, power, communication, interpretation and organization is needed’ 
(Beunen et al., forthcoming, p. 7). Students learn that the landscape itself, 
a common used ‘object’ throughout the educational curriculum, is a social 
construction. It is not something that simply exists; it is a visual image of 
cultural meanings based on different ways of seeing (Wylie 2007: 91). This is 
one of the most important lessons learned during the foreign excursion, as 
will be mentioned later. Students have to develop their own opinion regarding 
how they should deal with these cultural meanings in the educational and 
professional field of spatial planning and landscape architecture.
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4.2  Reflexivity in spatial planning and landscape 
architecture education
In the world of landscape architecture and spatial planning a believe 
in instrumental rationality, the possibility of steering and control, has 
always been very strong (Allmendinger, 2009; Scott, 1998; Flyvbjerg, 2002). 
However, influenced by the increase of a fragmented society, landscape 
dilemmas become more and more complex. Master plans are often outdated 
before being implemented. When the gap between the general society and 
the planning culture becomes too big, ‘people become dissatisfied with the 
planning system, then the formerly assumed objective knowledge of the 
planners looses its perceived objectivity, becomes part of just one idea on the 
spatial organisation of the land, one idea amongst others.’ (Van Assche, 2004: 
228). Understanding this ‘opposition’ versus top-down planning processes 
asks for different planning and design strategies and methods. Increasing 
attention towards the importance of the planning and design context is 
mentioned by Flyvbjerg (1998), Van Assche (2004), Duineveld (2006) and 
Beunen (2010). A reflexive approach on this planning and design world 
Identity design workshop in Wroclav.
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in its context can be researched via new tools for planners and landscape 
architects. The basis for these tools is formed by paying attention to power 
and discourse analyses, cultural habits, history and memory, and conflict 
and justice. To be able to use these tools, planners and landscape architects 
have to accept their own changing role: instead of starting as an active 
participant in the planning and design process, using methods and tools to 
make ‘good’ plans, based on ‘rational’ criteria), they start as observers of the 
context in which the planning and design process will take place (Flyvbjerg, 
1998, 2002). Phronetic planning research theory can assist in this type of 
research. This theory’s value-rational questions (Flyvbjerg, 2004: 289) differ 
from the traditional questions based on a technical rational approach. 
Phronetic questions are about ethics, values and interests and consider the 
role of the planner himself as well. A very important aspect what should be 
included in this view is the aspect of power. ‘Who wins?’, ‘Who loses?’ and 
‘By which mechanisms of power?’ are two of Flyvbjergs central questions for 
a phronetic planning research (Flyvbjerg, 2002: 356). Scientists act in this 
way, according to Fuchs (2001), as ‘second-order’ observers. They observe 
and reflect on thoughts, motivations and actions of first-order observers who 
deal with their object: the landscape and its spatial processes.
The shift in focus on the role of landscape architecture and spatial planning 
shows similarities and interesting interconnections with the ‘Cultural turn’ 
in geography (Wylie, 2007). As the cultural geographer Wylie argues: ‘...
the landscape-text [...] is understood as being organised around questions 
of power and authority. In consequence, the task of the critical reader 
centres upon uncovering the hidden codes and meanings, and unquestioned 
assumptions, which in actuality structure how the text of landscape is read.’ 
(Wylie, 2007: 71). We think spatial planners and landscape architects should 
take up the role of the ‘critical reader’. This reflective approach will come at 
hand in unfamiliar circumstances, which differ from everyday situations, 
for example in different cultures and countries where competing stories 
of reality co-exist. According to Beunen et al., (forthcoming, p. 5) different 
countries, even regions, have different planning and design traditions, 
different commonplace notions of the professions and their practitioners. 
The theoretical background described here, can be illustrated by experiences 
of the foreign excursion for landscape architecture and spatial planning 
students of Wageningen University, which took place in the summer of 2010.
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4.3 Excursion experiences
The foreign excursion, the so called Buitex, is organised by students of the 
study Landscape Architecture and Spatial Planning. This trip is one of the 
biggest events of the study association ‘Genius Loci’ each year and not part 
of the regular study program at Wageningen University. Students who join 
are participating voluntarily which often leads to a very motivated and 
interested group of students. In the year 2010, the theme of the excursion 
was based on a different approach as opposed to previous years. Whereas 
normally famous and world-leading cities and projects deemed relevant 
for landscape architecture and planning are being visited, this journey was 
based on a more critical-reflective focus. The main theme of the trip was: 
‘Crossing Borders!’ and the destinations were several locations in eastern 
Germany, western Poland and the north of the Czech Republic.
The theme was not only about old and new borders, moving and fading 
borders; it also focussed very much on culture, cultural heritage, landscape 
and history along and within these borders. The region visited had a 
Discussing world heritage in Dresden.
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turbulent history of changing borders due to historical developments like the 
first and second world war, the Russian socialistic regime and ‘Die Wende’. 
Every development left its own characteristics and the region tried its best 
to apply to these changes. History has influenced the landscape, culture and 
society of the people.
Students started to observe the landscape visited seen from their own, also 
by their education influenced, perspectives. Doing so however, seemed to 
be not satisfying in this region. The visual aspects of the current state of the 
landscape seemed to hide essential information, important for understanding 
this landscape. Uncertainties about how to get to know and understand this 
region started to occur. Questions like, ‘Is what we see really the history 
of the region?’ rose. A different approach for understanding the identity 
and situation of this region was needed here; students were forced to act 
as second order observers. Students started to have a look from different 
viewpoints, to create a better understanding about what was going on in the 
region. Questions like ‘What is cultural heritage and for whom, in whose 
eyes and during which period in time?’ came up. A concrete example during 
the trip, which stimulated thoughts about these questions, was the visit to 
the ex-UNESCO Elbe bridge in Dresden. ‘Why did the UNESCO delete the 
Elbe valley from the list? What makes that suddenly heritage is not heritage 
anymore? Does heritage only exist when it is noted as being heritage?’ Also 
the visit to the post-mining area in Lusatia (near Cottbus, eastern Germany) 
stimulated this. ‘Can such an industrial area become cultural heritage? 
Which aspects can be and which aspects not? Why is that?’ There was no 
clear and simple answer to these questions. The three countries visited also 
had their own attitude towards the concept of heritage; people dealt with 
this aspect in different ways. Examples like the cross-border Fürst-Pückler 
park in Bad Muskau (Germany-Poland) and the city of Görlitz/Zgorzelec 
(Germany-Poland) show the different ways of maintenance of buildings, 
parks and public space. Where in the German part of the Fürst-Pückler 
park the space was maintained very much into detail, the Polish side was 
more left to the natural developments. Also the communication between 
both parts of the park was not perfect as students discovered by talking to 
a guide. Big border differences were visible in the city of Görlitz/Zgorzelec. 
The German part was well maintained, especially on the side facing the 
Polish border. In contrast the Polish part showed not that well maintained 
buildings and public space. A visit to the Ksiaz Castle (Poland) summarised a 
lot of other questions the students had during the trip, just in one situation. 
Questions like: ‘Who decides what cultural heritage is and what is shown to 
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inhabitants and public?’ (who has the power to decide this?), ‘Which identity 
do you want to take from the past?’, ‘What are borders and how are borders 
constructed?’ and ‘What are the visible and non-visible influencing aspects of 
borders on the people who live next to them?’ rose here. Students concluded 
that borders between countries, identities and groups of people are not given 
and essentialist entities but constructed by people. Also they realised that 
borders change over time.
4.4 Learning moments
Almost none of the students where familiar with the background of the 
places visited. For understanding this new place, students had to observe 
open-minded; without prejudices or with explicit prejudices. This attitude 
turned out to increase the ‘level of discoveries’ regarding silenced stories, 
politics and identity. It turned out that the prejudices about the places 
visited were build upon social constructions of reality. In this way the 
students also learned about themselves. They have, like every person, 
prejudices regarding certain places. Adjusting people’s own prejudices 
really helps their own learning process about the way people construct 
their own realities, their ways of seeing. By asking local inhabitants (from 
several ethnic backgrounds) living in the area, experts and the teachers to 
answer the questions, it was noticed that they all have their own opinion and 
viewpoint towards reality as well. Critical questions and listening to people 
telling their own story about the area and the things that happened there 
during history gave important information, showing competing stories. 
Some were advocated, others marginalised. It was necessary for the students 
to discuss and evaluate this information afterwards in order to develop an 
own opinion and understanding about the situation. It showed the students 
the importance of reflexivity.
Pronetic research was carried out by the students, by asking inhabitants and 
guides critical questions, reading information in detail and trying to get to 
know the changes in history very thoroughly. Students were not told how 
they should carry out assignments, but more how events happened in a 
certain context and how spatial planners and landscape architects could be 
aware of this and make use of the information in order to develop an own 
opinion. Students learned that there is not one right/true/false story about 
an area and that nothing can be kept under total control. Also it showed that 
planning and design always involves decision making were some loose other 
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win (Flyvbjerg, 2002). Discussing about the experiences and different views 
towards situations and reflecting on this individually but also in the group 
was essential to formulate conclusions. The observed landscape is the result 
of choices people made in the past. In this way a troubled past also can cause 
conflicts in the present day. Negative stories are often hidden or deleted 
from the landscape. Students realised that it was important to be critical and 
conduct research on the stories which are not visible anymore in the physical 
landscape. The trip also made the students aware of their own frame-work in 
which they were used to operate. ‘Being aware of this framework also makes 
us aware of the framework of others’ (Student’s quote). This fits quite well to 
what Beunen et al. explain about what students should learn in their studies. 
‘Students learn to analyze landscape and planning and design practices, to 
study spatial developments, to comprehend differing spatial claims, and to 
generate alternative solutions for example. Reflect on these practices as well 
as on their potential roles and contributions’ (Beunen et al., forthcoming, 
p. 5 and 6). Acting as a second-order observer, asking critical questions 
about the local situation and (historical) context, was necessary for a better 
understanding of the area.
Nazi remnants in German heritage situated in Poland.
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4.5 Conclusion
Based on the remarks and observations of students who participated 
during the above described foreign excursion, we may firstly conclude that 
obtaining a reflective attitude should be an important aspect in planning and 
design educational programmes. Secondly we want to stress the importance 
of learning-by-doing. In this line Beunen et al. remarks that the real use of 
educational theory for practitioners ‘partly implies that we need to train their 
(students) reflective skills by means of assignments on real life situations, 
the social and political context in which they are ought to work.’ (Beunen et 
al., forthcoming, p. 11) Only when students are confronted with practical 
situations outside the academic world the added value of reflection kicks 
in. Landscape’s ‘silenced stories’ become visible. Students start to question 
their own attitude and role in the planning and design process. They start to 
become more realistic. The foreign excursion mentioned above is a method 
to make students more aware of the importance of being reflexive. In this 
way, future professionals are more aware of the limitations and possibilities 
of their role as landscape architects and spatial planners.
Observing new construction works in Dresden.
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Chapter  5.
Settlers, environmentalism and identity: 
Western Galilee 1949-1965
Report on a pilot study
Rakefet Sela-Sheffy
5.1 Introduction
5.1.1 Identity work from below
While top down policies are important for the formation of collective identities, 
they are not always as overpowering as they are sometimes believe to be, 
as emerges, for instance, from the bulk of studies on national propaganda 
and education. Their effectiveness inevitably depends on the way they are 
received, if at all, in specific social settings. With this in mind, my project 
aims to examine grassroots processes of identity formation, as developed in a 
specific local context – the Israeli-Jewish society in Western Galilee during 
early Israeli Statehood. In line with constructionist approaches, I take identity 
to mean the concrete performance of ‘the kind of a person I am and where 
I belong’ (Goffman, 1959), which is produced by individuals as members 
of groups, according to resources available to them in everyday contexts 
(Swidler, 1986) – be it a family, an occupation, a locality, etc. Participating in 
an environmental movement can also serve such a site for identity work (e.g. 
Kitchell et al., 2000). While macro-level environmental discourses have been 
profoundly studied, it is only recently that studying environmental identities 
in this micro-scale sense is beginning to take shape. From this perspective, 
I find the history of the Israeli environmental movement a very interesting 
case, precisely because of its co-occurrence with Israeli nationalism and 
state formation processes.
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5.1.2  Israeli proto-environmentalism – a brief historical 
overview
While in the USA and Europe environmental movements originated already 
back in the 19th and early 20th centuries, in Israel (and formerly British-
ruled Palestine) this process was belated. By and large, it depended on a 
belated modernization process, which was introduced to this territory by 
two central forces: the Hebrew national culture-building project, which 
transformed the local social space ever since the late 19th century; and 
the British Mandate, which ruled Palestine between 1918 and 1948. Before 
British times, awareness of and sentiments for the Nature and the Land, as 
conceptualized today by Western cultures, are believed to have been alien 
to both Jewish and Arab traditional communities. Descriptions of Palestine 
in late 19th century under Ottoman rule report unrestricted exploitation 
of natural resources by excessive grazing, wood cutting, fires and hunting 
(Figure 1 and 2). The British Mandate initiated nature protecting regulations, 
yet it had little impact on the local communities. As for the emerging modern 
Hebrew culture, it was inherently ambivalent with regard to this matter: on 
the one hand, influenced by European Modernism, it embraced the idea 
that intimate experience with the natural environment was indispensible 
for the formation of a ‘healthy Native Hebrew Person’. On the other hand, 
it is believed that the very idea of nature conservation conflicted with the 
national mission of ‘conquering the wilderness’ (e.g. De-Shalit, 1985).
Figure 1. Kibbutz Hanita early settlement 1938 (the Wall and Tower operation); still 
under severe grazing and wood cutting.
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Nevertheless, as early as the 1900s, a dozen of young Jewish zoologists and 
botanists began to study systematically the flora and fauna of geographical 
Palestine16. As European-oriented scholars, they formed an elitist circle of 
professionals; at the same time, as ideologically driven Zionists, they also 
claimed a role in the Hebrew cultural revival. Consequently, in the Hebrew 
teacher-seminaries biology and geography (‘Erdkunde’) became major fields 
of study. During the 1920s and 1930s there emerged clubs of Nature Lovers 
and Wandering Teachers, endorsed by the leading Zionist bodies; In 1931, 
a Hebrew periodical for Nature and the Land was founded, and in 1953 the 
Society for the Protection of Nature in Israel (SPNI) – the first nationwide green 
body in Israel – was officially founded by a group of 70 devotees, who were 
joined by several thousands of members over the next few years (Alon, 
1959). However, it was not before the mid- 1960s, with the foundation of the 
16  Before the British Mandate ‘Palestine’ never constituted a political or administrative unit. Under the 
Ottoman Empire Ottoman this territory was taken to loosely encompass parts of nowadays Lebanon, 
Syria, Israel, and Jordan.
Figure 2. The old tower of Kibbutz Hanita, 1990s, after forestation and nature 
protecting actions.
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Israel Nature and National Parks Authority that all this hitherto predominantly 
voluntary-based activity evolved into an economic and legal apparatus.
Consequently, although seminal attempts to write a history of the Israeli 
environmental movement have concentrated largely on organizations and 
legislation on the national level, they all agree that these processes were 
massively propelled from below (Tal, 2002). While the SPNI was originated 
by a group of professionals, it actually started as an avant-garde popular 
movement based on local networks in peripheral areas, about whom we still 
know very little.
5.1.3 Grassroots processes
The notion of grassroots is most often used in the context of anti-establishment 
spontaneous actions (e.g. Cable and Benson, 1993; Kousis et al., 2008). 
However, not always is local action geared to a pointedly political agenda; 
often, in fact, it reveals interdependencies with centralized forces and enjoys 
cooperation of the authorities (Rootes, 2007). The SPNI is a typical case in 
point. While its early activists were often seen as eccentric (sometime even 
anarchist), their action was actually imbued with ‘banal nationalism’ (Billig, 
1985), the doxa of the Hebrew-Israeli society at the time. This complexity 
in conceiving of social movements is addressed by the culture-approach 
(e.g. Poletta, 2008; Swidler, 1995) which moves away from seeing these 
movements as rationally organized groups fighting for well-defined political 
goals. Instead, it takes them in a broader sense, to be social spaces within 
which cultural repertoire is learned and maintained. In line with practice 
theories, notably that of Pierre Bourdieu, environmental sociologists (e.g. 
Crossley, 2003; Haluza-DeLay, 2008) talk about an environmental habitus 
– in the sense of a complex of cultural dispositions and practice models 
that are acquired and performed in a given time and space. In this light, 
my project focuses on the experience of the participants in their own natural 
habitat: their motivation to act, their sentiments and aspirations, and the 
social role they assumed in their communities.
5.1.4 The regional setting – peripherality
Western Galilee (stretching along the northern coastal plain of Israel, 19 
km from Acre to Rosh-HaNiqra on the Lebanese border, and around 25 km 
eastwards up to the mountain range; Figure 3 and 4) was one of the areas 
where Nature protection activism burgeoned most rapidly during early 
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Figues 3. Map of Israel.
Figure 4. Map of Western Galilee.
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statehood, and one of the pioneering centers of the SPNI activity from its 
very initiation. The reason for this accelerated process was, I believe, the 
extreme socio-geographical peripherality of this region. From the viewpoint 
of the Jewish society in Palestine before Israeli statehood (1948), it was 
a remote frontier, inhabited sparsely by Arab, Druze and Bedouins living 
on traditional farming and grazing, with even sparser Jewish settlements 
between 1934 and 1949. The latter were modern agricultural communities 
(mainly Kibbutzim) founded by young newcomers from Central and Eastern 
Europe or natives of Palestine, who arrived in the region in groups supported 
by the Jewish settlement bodies. As a result of the 1947-1949 Israeli-Arab 
war and the formation of the Israeli state (1948), this region underwent rapid 
transformation, with Arab communities on the coastal plain largely gone, 
and with the intensification of Jewish communities, mainly Kibbutzim, but 
also semi-urban communities of newcomers from the Near East and North 
Africa, together with some industry and tourism along the coast (Sofer and 
Yedaaya, 1975). It was this growing community of Jewish-Hebrew ‘veteran 
settlers’ who then became the social elite of this region; it was also they who 
became the chief proponents of environmental action in this area.
5.2 Preliminary hypotheses
So far I have interviewed 7 key informants, inhabitants of the region, between 
70 to over 90 years old, and started to trace whatever archival material that 
could be found, identifying a core group of 20-25 old-time participants, and 
their broader milieu. Naturally I do not rely on their retrospective testimonies 
for accurate reconstruction of historical events. To the contrary, I take their 
personal narratives to be mythologies of selves and the collective (e.g. Andrews 
et al., 2006). On the basis of these preliminary findings I suggest the following 
points for further consideration:
5.2.1 Environmental habitus as a resource
My interviewees reveal that appropriating a nature loving ethos and 
environmental practices provided them with a sense of empowerment and 
social distinction (to use Bourdieu’s terminology). Moreover, the vigor of 
nature loving as an avant-garde disposition lied, in their eyes, precisely in that 
it endowed these activists with distinction vis-à-vis their own communities, 
often at the risk of being condemned as the ‘enemies of the people’.
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Vignette 1
Joseph grew up in one of the pioneer Kibbutzim in this region, which farms 
fish ponds. The ponds attract many water birds; shooting the birds was very 
common at the time. As a teenager in the 1940s Joseph used to help the 
hunters collecting the shot birds. Later, however, after having graduated from 
the Kibbutzim teacher seminary, which was known as an incubator of Nature 
lovers, he openly opposed the bird shooters. In his interview he emphasizes 
that he had gone very far with his conviction even at the cost of fighting his 
own peers. At first, he tried to convince them not to hunt, using his artillery 
of professional and moral rhetoric: ‘I’d tell them look… these birds come to 
us for the winter and … this is an educational asset […] an aesthetic experience 
for travelers coming to this area… don’t’ hunt, you are not so poor that you 
need this duck for food […]’ (lines 237-239; emphases added).17 As he gradually 
became involved with the SPNI, however, he started to report the shooters. He 
accentuates that he would report ‘even members of our Kibbutz […] then they 
came complaining that I was an informer… they accused me of being disloyal, 
that I gave away my own people […]’ [lines 242-243].
5.2.2  Social networks as generators of environmental habitus
Where did these young people acquire this disposition? Originally, many of 
them were already equipped with a modern, romantic, anti-urban pantheism 
acquired through their secular education at elementary schools or agricultural 
boarding schools, youth movements, or the Hebrew teacher seminaries, all 
of which were elite institutions in pre-State times. The practice of hiking 
and trekking was particularly endorsed by these educational channels. As 
a social ritual it was not necessarily connected with nature protection; in 
fact, it was often associated with anti-protection activities, such as collecting 
plants or even hunting. But the knowledge and habits of getting acquainted 
with Nature were already there.
Yet how was this disposition maintained in the local arena? Two 
interdependent social networks in particular seem to have been responsible 
for it:
1. In 1952, a Regional Geographical Circle, the first of its kind in the country, 
was founded by members of the local kibbutzim in the region. They were 
around a hundred nature freaks and devoted hikers, including biology 
teachers and academics, and amateur archeologists, whose interest lied in 
exploring the region’s natural phenomena and ancient sites. Although this 
17  All translations are mine.
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was a volunteer association, it nevertheless initiated serious campaigns 
such as zoological, botanical, geological and archeological surveys and 
mapping projects, the findings of which were subsequently published in 
a special series they established (e.g. Yedaaya and Gil, 1961), which often 
enjoyed the recognition of university scholars. The Circle also organized 
conventions and trips, created nature collections and exhibitions, and 
launched the project of marking paths.
2. This highly active group, dispersed throughout the region, served the pool 
of volunteers who participated in the earliest SPNI Nature protection 
campaigns. At this early phase, there was actually no clear-cut distinction 
between the SPNI action and that of the Regional Circle. Igal, one of the 
founders of the regional Circle, was also the first NPNI employee in the 
country. Recruited in 1956, he later mobilized his friends – as volunteers 
or part-time workers – to help in the various campaigns he initiated with 
the SPNI. The SPNI thus relied on these local agents for information and 
services. In this way, most of the campaigns were actually locally based 
and emerged from the community, and thus not really conflicting with its 
needs.
Vignette 2
In the 1950s, the increased population of boars in the Galilee was declared a 
severe threat to agricultural plantations. The ministry of agriculture fought 
the boars with pesticides. However, as the locals observed, while the number of 
boars was not reduced, poisoning was devastating to other wild animals and 
birds. A survey was then launched between 1957 and 1962 by the local SPNI 
agent ‘together with people of the settlements’ (Sela, 1963: 238); they worked 
‘under the assumption that if there is no way to improve the efficacy of the 
poison, or find a replacement for it, there is no reason to jeopardize in vain 
the large population of birds and wild as well as domestic animals – which are 
being poisoned directly or indirectly’ (ibid).
Another example is the central role of the Regional Circle in initiating cave 
research in Israel:
Vignette 3
In 1952, Igal discovered a stalactite cave while wandering in a local Wadi 
(Wadi al-Dilb; now Nahal Namer). The news spread, and the cave attracted 
thousands of visitors. ‘I am sad to report’, he writes, ‘that these visitors left 
behind them cans, bottles, soot on the walls, and even worse; most of the 
small stalactites were demolished’ (Sela, 1959: 41). Members of the Regional 
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Circle tried to fight these phenomena. In 1955 they gathered dozens of local 
school children in the Wadi to mark paths to the cave so as to control access 
to it. With the support of the Regional Council a lock was installed on the 
cave. But because of road constructions in the area it was left broken, and 
preventing the destruction of the stalactites was impossible. Nevertheless, a 
trend of cave searching developed rapidly throughout the following decade 
by local, highly motivated adventurers, who managed to mobilize the Post & 
Telephones services as well as the army for technical support (such as hug 
ladders for climbing to inaccessible spots, or cables for sliding down cave 
pits). This trend yielded the discovery and mapping of 35 caves throughout 
the Galilee, the documentation of which was handed over to the Hebrew 
University and became the basis for an academic cave research in Israel.
5.2.3 Activists’ self role-images
Finally, what were the personal motivation and forms of self-gratification 
invested by these settlers in their environmental action? As my pilot 
interviews suggest, they all treated this activity as a vocation, one that met 
their internal drive and grew organically in the course of their lives, and at 
the same time also involved social responsibility and leadership. Accordingly, 
they wavered between three main role-images which they have embraced 
so as to make sense of their action and build their authority as agents of 
cultural change. Let me briefly mention these role-images:
1. The educator. One way or another all my interviewees saw themselves as 
educators in the sense that they were dealing with changing conceptions 
and habits within their community. ‘I persuaded the nursery teachers’ 
Joseph says, ‘that daffodils are beautiful when they grew in the field. 
Go with the children, enjoy, and go home, do not pick [the flowers]… [I 
was doing this] even before the SPNI started its campaign [for protecting 
wild flowers]’ (lines 272-274). As mentioned, some of them were actually 
teachers by their profession; those who worked with the SPNI served as 
teacher-guides and later as supervisors in the Nature Reserves. Regardless 
of their official title, however, they all portray themselves as total educators 
who combine science and humanities, devoting countless extra hours to 
their mission.
2. The professional researcher. All my interviewees were also mindful of 
acquiring a highly professional-scientists profile. In their interviews, they 
exhibit profound knowledge in botany, zoology, geology, climatology 
or archeology, often using scientific jargon. For instance, here is how 
Michael, (who died in 2010 at the age of 95), tells about a colleague, who 
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‘[…] published his findings, with a picture of […] the Blue Water Lily – 
Nymphaea caerulea, as it is called in Latin […] According to Linné, […]’ 
(lines 288-293). They had connections with academic researchers, who 
in turn acknowledged these local agents’ expertness and consulted with 
them in their studies. Michael, narrating his joining a research expedition 
for sea turtle hatching in the area, is also very aware of acknowledging the 
discoverer of a phenomenon he is describing, as a token of a professional 
ethics:
[one day in 1952] I got a message from [Prof Heinrich] Mendelssohn: 
‘Michael […] we are going to Akhziv […] you’ll see there a very interesting 
natural phenomenon, (-) sea turtles.’ (-) Well I waited for Mendelssohn, 
and also for Prof. [Alexander] Barash […]18 and we drove to Akhziv… 
and there Igal waited for us […] we saw the whole process [of hatching] 
and it was impressive! It is extraordinary. But Igal is [actually] the one 
who discovered [the whole thing] […] (lines 115-130).
3. The authentic Nature freak and hiker: this is the most stereotypical image 
usually attributed to the earlier generation of SPNI members. They 
are usually mythologized as non-conformist, unaffected, risk taking 
adventurers with unrestrained love for nature and the land. Etan, a local 
kibbutz member, exhibits this disposition to the fullest. For instance, this 
is how he recounts his first arrival to the region in 1948, at the age of 15:
[My fiend and I] heard […] that… a leopard was caught in Western 
Galilee, in a Wadi […] so we both took backpacks and […] came [to 
the region] with backpacks and sleeping bags and soup powders. […] 
We wandered four days […] in the Wadi. […] We used to wander alone 
throughout the country, without problems (lines 94-127).
He clarifies that being a hiker was his natural disposition, independently of 
any official constraints: ‘[…] I used to hike… don’t belong to any body… the 
SPNI did not yet exist [when I started]’ (line 34). He is therefore quit critical 
of institutionalized environmentalism and makes a point of dissociating 
himself from mainstream organizations, including the SPNI: ‘[…] we started 
building […] the field school [in Akhziv]… [I was involved] not as a regular 
member, [but rather] only… when I was needed. […]’ (lines 572-576); ‘soon 
enough […] I no longer liked it […] it no longer suited me […]’ (lines 726-727). 
Consequently, he claims an inherent authentic understanding of nature, to 
18  Both Prof. Mendelssohn and Prof. Barash were among the founders of the Zoological Institute in Tel 
Aviv, later to become the basis for the Biology Department at Tel Aviv University upon its foundation 
(1953).
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the point of despising the recent trendy scientific-like environmentalism, 
which he calls a ‘panic of Nature protection’: ‘I said we need to protect 
Nature but [also] to remain normal […] it was a kind of transformation from 
[no awareness at all] to Nature protection orthodoxy […]’ (lines 736-742).
5.3 Conclusion
There is a seeming paradox in the fact that these proto-environmentalism 
emerged from within agricultural communities, the forerunners of the 
Hebrew settlement movement in this region, whose practical interests 
obviously conflicted with nature preservation. These people’s earlier 
environmental actions were not about defending their interests, such as 
public health or social justice, but rather about Nature Protection as such. 
Why was it important to them? Given the hardships of their life as settlers 
in a remote periphery, this concern would have appeared as eccentric – as 
indeed it was often seen. The reason for it must therefore have been cultural. 
Beyond material conditions, I suggest that this was a matter of identity struggle 
in the face of a changing socio-demographic surrounding. These secular Jewish 
settlers were new in the region and novice in agricultural work. Even if many 
of them were natives of Palestine, they still had to get better acquainted with 
the place and get used to rural life. In making this region their home, they 
had the ambivalent position of competing with both old-time Arab and Druze 
communities, on the one hand, and newly-arrived Jewish communities, on 
the other. I suggest that the Modern repertoire of Nature Loving attitudes 
and practices, which were alien to the local traditional communities of both 
non-Jewish natives and Jewish newcomers, served them as a distinguishing 
resource for claiming status as locals. Given that the non-Jewish population 
was by then severely disempowered, this identity contest seems to have 
been first and foremost an internal dynamics within the Jewish society.
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Chapter  6.
Symposium on cultural heritage and 
identity politics
11 October 2011
Rosalie van Dam
Cultural Heritage and Identity Politics was the focus of the second Ibn 
Battuta symposium. The symposium addressed the various ways in which 
identity and the politics of identity and the production and signification of 
cultural heritage are entangled.
Roel During discussed identity politics in European heritage discourses. He 
started his presentation with the question: Dutch heritage, World heritage 
it seems so familiar to us, but what is European heritage? Can a windmill 
be both Dutch and European heritage? According to the Venice Charter 
governments have the obligation to take care of cultural heritage, the Faro 
convention focuses more on the value of cultural heritage for society. The 
Faro definition of cultural heritage claims its value as memory, identification 
and creativity. Cultural heritage and identity discourses coincide in the 
discussions on European citizenship, cross cultural understanding, economic 
specialization and tourism development. Roel During developed five models 
concerning the relation heritage and identity: (1) an Cartesian model 
suitable for regional branding; (2) a Narrative model suitable for achieving 
value consensus; (3) a Contextual model suitable for intercultural learning 
and stability; (4) an Onion model suitable for nesting identities; and (5) a 
Drifting model in which identities are constructed and reconstructed by 
internalising certain events. In the end also the issue of zero sum identity 
(more European identity necessarily implies less national identity and more 
regional identity implies less national identity) and the absence of a pluralist 
view on European society was addressed.
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Itamar Even-Zohar, Professor Emeritus of Culture Research of Tel Aviv 
University spoke about the Identity dynamics between market and 
institutions. In his view identity work, is only partly overlapping with heritage 
work. According to him there is a decline of identity politics. Whereas in 
earlier days the making of identity was an indispensable in the making of a 
nation state (for example forming Italy out of many regions), nowadays many 
nation states are no longer dominant identity/image makers. Citizens accept 
power willingly because they already have the identity (for example being 
Italian). According to Mr. Even-Zohar heritage work is highly commodofied 
and doesn’t function for who it is designed. Heritage in his view is mostly 
a competition about ‘who has the better goods’ (in relation to tourism) than 
that is it about the signification for the life of people.
Then, Buitex Students Maaike Andela and Ralph Tagelder shared their 
experiences concerning crossing borders. ‘The Buitex’ is a commission of the 
study association Genius Loci of the study Landscape architecture and Spatial 
Planning (Wageningen University). In the summer of 2010 they organised a 
trip with the main theme: ’Crossing borders’. The study area was the area 
around Dresden (Germany) and Wroclaw (Poland). This region surprised 
the students with their turbulent history, great (landscape-)architecture, 
beautiful nature and most of all by the hidden stories between people and 
their landscape.
Ms. Rakefet Sela-Sheffy, Associate Professor at the Unit of Culture Research, 
Faculty of Humanities, Tel Aviv University, took us to the world of settlers, 
environmentalism and identity. Her main fields are identity and group-
status, talk and self-representations, canon formation, cultural models, 
popular culture, cultural contacts, translation, pre-State and contemporary 
Israeli culture. She talked about a project concerning Israeli proto-
environmentalism, grassroot processes and initiatives in Western Galilee in 
1949-1965. The pilotstudy shows that the modern repertoire of nature loving 
attitudes and practices which were alien to the traditional communities 
served them as an exclusive resource for claiming status as locals (avant-
garde). Moreover, the activits’ had a sense of vacation which grew organically 
in the course of their lives.
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Cultural heritage seems like apple cake: who is against it? 
Sometimes it looks like a topic lacking political discussions. 
Scientists and cultural heritage experts produce knowledge 
on historic values and objective criteria and claim everything 
to be under control. If  the right procedures are deployed, 
tourists, residents, everyone! benefits. However, reality is 
different. When focusing on identity discussions, politicians 
are very influential on the selection and signification of 
cultural heritage. The production of cultural heritage takes 
place at the fringe of remembering and social forgetting 
of a society. What should be remembered and what ought 
to be forgotten however is a key issue in politics. Political 
claims on societal progress involve picturing a selection 
of the past and its manifestations as outdated, sometimes 
designated as cultural heritage. This discourse on societal 
progress reproduces images of the roots and characteristics 
of a society: the issue of identity. As such and in various 
other ways the politics of identity plays an important role 
in the production and signification of cultural heritage. This 
symposium on cultural heritage and identity politics focuses 
on revealing these ways and discussing their implications.
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